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Abstract—China has experienced a spectacular economic
growth in recent decades. Its economy grew more than 48 times
from 1980 to 2013. How are the other countries reacting to
China’s rise? Do they see it as an economic opportunity or
a security threat? In this paper, we answer this question by
analyzing online news reports about China published in Australia,
France, Germany, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the UK and the
US. More specifically, we first analyze the frequency with which
China has appeared in news headlines, which is a measure of
China’s influence in the world. Second, we build a Naive Bayes
classifier to study the evolving nature of the news reports, i.e.,
whether they are economic or political. We then evaluate the
friendliness of the news coverage based on sentiment analysis.
Empirical results indicate that there has been increasing news
coverage of China in all the countries under study. We also find
that the emphasis of the reports is generally shifting towards
China’s economy. Here Japan and South Korea are exceptions:
they are reporting more on Chinese politics. In terms of global
sentiment, the picture is quite gloomy. With the exception of
Australia and, to some extent, France, all the other countries
under examination are becoming less positive towards China.
I. INTRODUCTION
China’s rise promises to be one of the great dramas of
the 21st century. Its economy grew more than 48 times
from 1980 to 2013. Figure 1 shows the dramatic growth
of the Chinese GDP from 1961 to 2013 relative to other
major economies.1 Economists argue about whether China will
become the world’s largest economy; political scientists argue
about whether China’s rise can be peaceful and beneficial for
the rest of the world. It is of great importance to understand
how countries around the world are reacting to the increasingly
prosperous and assertive China: do they perceive China’s rise
as an opportunity or a threat?
In this paper, we focus on eight representative countries:
Australia, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Russia, the
UK and the US. The US is the world’s only current su-
perpower. France, Germany and the UK are Europe’s three
largest economies. Japan and South Korea are China’s close
neighbors and China is their largest trading partner. Russia is
a former superpower and has a strong economic, diplomatic,
and military relationship with China. Australia is culturally
Western but geographically in the East. China is Australia’s
largest trading partner.
1GDP figures are from the World Bank, available at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
Gauging public opinion is usually based on public opinion
polls. But time series poll data about attitudes towards China is
scarce. Opinion polls regarding China rarely stretch back more
than ten years. Examining newspapers offers an alternative: the
frequency with which China appears in news headlines can
serve as a measure of China’s global influence; classifying
news articles on China as either economic or political can
shed light on the evolving nature of foreign perspectives on
China; and the China Friendliness Index (proposed in this
work), based on sentiment analysis, can reveal the evolution
of China’s bilateral relations with the countries of interest.
Fig. 1: China’s spectacular economic growth in perspective
(1961-2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses related work in international relations, text classification
and sentiment analysis. Section 3 describes the details of our
dataset, the pre-processing procedures and the models. Section
4 presents the empirical findings. Section 5 discusses several
interesting patterns in the context of international relations.
Section 6 concludes this study.
II. RELATED WORK
Our work is motivated by the observation that China’s
rise is rapidly reshaping the international structure. We follow
Kenneth Waltz’s definition that the international structure is
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defined by the arrangement of the states and that the structure
changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across
the national states [1]. We concur with David Lake’s argument
that the international system is hierarchical and we contend
that because of China’s rapid rise, the relationship between
China and many other states is now being redefined [2].
Lake suggests that as China continues to grow, it is likely to
form its own coalition of allies to counter America’s current
hierarchies.2 Our work attempts to detect signs of realignment.
Our focus is on foreign perceptions of China’s rise: whether
the international community view it as a security threat or an
economic opportunity [4]. We believe foreign perceptions are
important [5], [6]. In particular we are concerned that China’s
rise might be upsetting the sense of security of other nations. In
this sense, our work seeks to empirically answer whether other
nations believe China’s rise can be peaceful or not, a question
that has been theoretically analyzed by John Mearsheimer [7].
In order to understand and measure foreign perceptions,
we examine foreign news media, which have long drawn
the attention of IR scholars. For example, Ramos, Ron and
Thoms study the reports of leading Western newspapers to
answer the question of what influences the Northern media’s
coverage of events and abuses in explicit human rights terms
[8]. Emilie Hafner-Burton constructs an autoregressive model
to analyze the effects naming and shaming on political terror
and political rights abuses [9]. More recently, Alastair Johnston
analyzes Chinese publications and argues that China has not
become more assertive despite all the Western suspicion and
accusations [10].
Methodologically, our work uses text classification and
sentiment analysis. First we build a Naive Bayes classifier to
investigate the evolving nature of foreign reports on China.
This is related to many studies in text classification [11],
[12]. In a recent study, a Naive Bayes classifier is used to
classify SMS messages received by UNICEF Uganda into
eleven classes [13]. The fact that their messages often contain
various abbreviations and spelling errors seriously affects their
initial results. The same data noise problem is not present here
as we are examining the news articles published by leading
news groups in respective countries. We test our classifier with
800 manually labeled articles, randomly chosen from the target
newspapers. The test results, reported in Section 3, show that
the Naive Bayes classifier is adequate for our task.
In addition to classifying news articles, our work also
evaluates the sentiments of these articles. In related work,
Pang et al. evaluate the sentiments in movie reviews [14].
Agarwal et al. analyze sentiments in Twitter messages [15].
Joo et al. study the communicative intents of images [16].
Compared with movie reviews and tweets, the news articles in
this study are much longer.3 The extraordinary lengths of these
texts make them an ideal candidate for sentiment evaluation
2An example will illustrate our point well. In March 2015, the UK became
the first major Western country to seek to become a founding member of the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is widely viewed as a
rival to the US-dominated World Bank and the IMF. The Wall Street Journal
wrote an article describing UK’s move as breaking ranks with Washington
[3].
3As will be detailed later, for each newspaper we will concatenate all the
articles published within a specific year into one super article. This makes our
text long and rich.
based on discriminant words. As we only have access to an
English dictionary of negative words, when processing news
articles in French and German, we first use Google Translate
to translate that dictionary into French and German.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data Collection
We have collected 132,834 articles from 11 leading news-
papers, all of which now have a web presence.4 Their summary
statistics are provided in Table 1. First, for each country
we select one representative newspaper and collect its news
reports on China.5 The selected newspapers are The New York
Times (US), The Guardian (UK), The Australian (Australia),
Le Figaro (France), Die Welt (Germany), The Daily Yomiuri
(Japan), RIA Novosti (Russia) and Korea Times (South Korea).
The Daily Yomiuri, RIA Novosti and Korea Times are published
in English. Le Figaro is in French; Die Welt is in German.
TABLE I: Summary statistics of the news articles
Country Newspaper # Articles Period
US New York Times 21,411 1981-2014
US Wall Street Journal 32,111 1984-2014
UK Guardian 11,130 1985-2014
UK Telegraph 6,813 2001-2014
UK Financial Times 21,029 1982-2014
AU The Australian 11,071 1995-2014
FR Le Figaro 7,990 1997-2014
DE Die Welt 7,467 2001-2014
JP Yomiuri 3,431 1990-2014
RU RIA Novosti 5,853 2000-2014
KR Korea Times 4,528 1999-2014
In collecting news articles, we use the keywords China
and Chinese in the title search. We confirm that articles
with keyword China’s as in China’s cyber game will also be
collected. For the French-language newspaper, Le Figaro, we
use in our search the key word Chine for China, Chinois for
Chinese. We confirm that articles with keyword Chinoise as in
la croissance chinoise will also be collected. For the German-
language newspaper, Die Welt, we use the keywords China
and Chinesisch. We confirm that articles with Chinesische,
Chinesischen, and Chinesischer in the headline are collected.
Second, in order to examine the differences between a
conservative newspaper and a liberal newspaper in the US
and the UK, we collect articles from The Wall Street Journal
to compare with The New York Times, and from The Daily
Telegraph (UK) to compare with The Guardian.
Third, to build the Naive Bayes classifier, we obtain 972
labeled articles on China’s economy and 995 labeled articles
on Chinese politics from The Financial Times (UK) through
queries based on the title and subjects. From the labeled
articles we extract 300 most common features for each class
and create listecon and listpols. The large corpus of the training
4Our articles of The Wall Street Journal come from ProQuest
(http://search.proquest.com/advanced). All other articles come from Lexis-
Nexis (http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic).
5We do not claim that the selected newspapers are fully representative of
national attitudes and we are aware that newspapers within a country may have
conflicting views. But in terms of foreign policy, we believe views expressed
by an influential newspaper offer a first-order approximation of the national
attitudes.
data enables us to keep all the extracted features. For example,
we are able to differentiate between Hong Kong and Hong
Kong’s.
Lastly, we obtain 1,000 labeled articles on China’s econ-
omy and 1,000 labeled articles on Chinese politics from Le
Figaro (France), and 600 labeled articles on China’s economy
and 600 labeled articles on Chinese politics from Die Welt
(Germany). In this way, we are able to train the classifier with
three datasets in three different languages. In the discussion
that follows, we will focus primarily on the English-language
classifier.
B. Naive Bayes Classifier
To save space, we do not report all the features in our
calculation. They are available at the authors’ website.6 Here
we only give some examples. Listecon contains such features
as chines (2749), market (2679), bank (2428), govern (2188),
growth (1886), compani (1798), econom (1791), shanghai
(1761), invest (1761), develop (1160), trade (1008). Listpols
contains such features as parti (2713), chines (2582), hong
kong (1845), polit (2151), govern (2588), beij (2198), protest
(1699), japan (1189), democraci (1124), taiwan (735), militari
(687). Notice that certain features may appear in both lists,
such as econom and govern, but their frequencies differ.
To each feature wi in the news article we assign a weight
in the following manner:
φ(wi)|listj =

count of wi in listj×1000
total counts of listj
, if wi ∈ listj
min
wk∈listj
count of wk in listj×1000
total counts of listj×10 , otherwise;
(1)
where
min
wk∈listecon
count of wk in listecon × 1000
total counts of listecon × 10 = 0.0977, (2)
min
wk∈listpols
count of wk in listpols × 1000
total counts of listpols × 10 = 0.1001. (3)
If the feature is in the list, we assign to it a weight equal
to the relative size of the feature in the list times 1000. If
otherwise, we assign to it a uniform weight equal to the
smallest relative size of any feature in the list times 100.
Notice that here we have added a penalizing factor of 10 in the
design. An article l is then classified as economic if and only if∏
article l
(φ(wi)|listecon) >
∏
article l
(φ(wi)|listpols). (4)
That is, a score is calculated for each class as the product
of the features’ weights under the assumption of independence.
The classifier then assigns the article to the class that gives it
the higher score. In the (rare) case where the article contains
none of the features in either list, it is classified as political
by default. This is a result from (1)(2)(3)(4). Notice that here
we have made the simplifying assumption that foreign reports
on China are either economic or political: there is no third
category such as culture or sports, and there is no overlap.
We use 800 manually labeled articles to test the accuracy
of the classifier. The test results are detailed in Table 2.
6https://www.sites.google.com/site/wangyurochester.
TABLE II: Test results for the news classifier
Newspaper # Articles Accuracy
New York Times 100 74%
The Guardian 100 83%
The Australian 100 87%
Le Figaro 100 85%
Die Welt 100 78%
Yomiuri 100 84%
RIA Novosti 100 72%
Korea Times 100 73%
Average 100 80%
C. Sentiment Analysis
When evaluating the sentiments of the news articles, we
use a collection of 4,790 negative words, 4,783 of which come
from an established dictionary [17].To this collection we have
added 7 words that have strong negative connotations in China-
related articles: military, dominate, authoritarian, communist,
dictatorship, dalai (lama) and pollution.7
Since our focus is not on individual articles but on news-
papers as a whole, sentiment analysis based on single articles
would be less than perfect in this study. One strongly negative
report could be more influential than two mildly positive
reports, a phenomenon described in psychological studies
as “the positive-negative asymmetry effect” [19], [20]. The
example below helps illustrate our point.8
Excerpt 1. Specifically, the provinces will accelerate con-
struction of roads and railways. Guangdong intends to build
a road link with the four neighbouring provinces by next year,
and a motorway to each area by 2007. (Mildly Positive)
Excerpt 2. The region will also promote co-operation on
energy, bringing power from the less-developed west to the
more industrialised east. (Mildly Positive)
Excerpt 3. Meanwhile, widening income gaps between
China’s urban and rural areas and coastal and interior
provinces are likely to fuel social discontent while endemic
corruption undermines respect for a Communist regime that
has very little ideological legitimacy left. (Strongly Negative)
We believe the overall evaluation of the three texts should
be negative, but evaluating texts individually would lead us
to conclude that the overall sentiment is positive. In order
to overcome this problem, we define a holistic metric, the
China Friendliness Index, to evaluate all the texts published
by a newspaper within a year. The China Friendliness Index
is constructed as follows:
I = 25− 300× (frequency of negative words)
total length of news articles
. (5)
The number 300, which we arrived at through trial and
error, is a scaling factor that makes sure the index stays
between 0 and 25. Subtracting from 25 then transforms what is
essentially a hostility measure into a measure of friendliness.
We design the Index based on negative words because psycho-
logical studies have consistently shown that the psychological
effects of bad ones outweigh those of the good ones [19], [20].
7We agree with Stephen Krasner that language usage reflects power distri-
bution [18].
8The original texts come from The Financial Times, January 14 and October
27, 2004.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section answers the following three questions one by
one: Is the world talking more about China? What are other
countries talking about regarding China: politics or economics?
Are other countries feeling more or less positive towards
China?
A. Volume of the Coverage
As China’s economy continues to grow, so does its in-
fluence on the world stage. It is therefore natural to expect
that China is now receiving more attention from foreign media
than before. This hypothesis can be tested by calculating the
absolute number of times that China appears in their news
headlines and the percentage of China-focused articles for each
newspaper each year. The result is shown in Figure 2.9 To test
for significance, we regress the percentage of China-focused
articles against year. The regression coefficients (coef.) and t
statistics (t) are reported following Figure 2.
Australia coef.=0.060 t=3.72 p=0.002
France coef.=0.023 t=3.11 p=0.007
Germany coef.=0.065 t=3.67 p=0.005
Japan coef.=0.023 t=1.57 p=0.130
Russia coef.=0.016 t=0.57 p=0.579
S. Korea coef.=0.020 t=0.55 p=0.588
UK coef.=0.003 t=0.46 p=0.650
US coef.=0.016 t=10.52 p=0.000
Fig. 2: Is the world talking more about China?
The result shows that all the countries under study have
been reporting more on China as measured by the percentage
of China-focused articles. The increase is statistically signif-
icant for Australia, France, Germany and the US. We also
report that as measured by the time series average, South Korea
(2.00%), Russia (1.80%) and Japan (1.51%) report on China
most frequently.
9Data on The Australian for the year 2005 are not complete.
B. Content of the Coverage
China’s rise is first and foremost an economic rise. Chinese
politics has also changed in the same period, but not nearly
by the same magnitude. Therefore, one would expect that the
world’s interest in China has been shifting towards China’s
economy and away from Chinese politics. This is where the
Naive Bayes classifier can help. For each year and each news-
paper, we calculate the percentage of China-centered articles
that are economic. To test for significance, we regress the
percentage variable against time. The regression coefficients
and t-statistics are reported following Figure 3.
Australia coef.=1.232 t=4.57 p=0.000
France coef.=0.956 t=1.74 p=0.102
Germany coef.=0.064 t=3.49 p=0.007
Japan coef.=-0.099 t=-0.40 p=0.694
Russia coef.=0.939 t=2.2 p=0.045
S. Korea coef.=-0.856 t=-1.83 p=0.089
UK coef.=0.496 t=3.06 p=0.005
US coef.=0.530 t=4.45 p=0.000
Fig. 3: What is the world talking about regarding China?
We find that the majority of the countries are focusing more
on China’s economy and less on Chinese politics and that in
2008 there is a dip in economic reporting in all the five Western
countries. The dip is particularly sharp in France. Protests in
Paris against the Beijing Olympic Games and the then French
president Sarkozy’s decision to meet with Dalai Lama severely
strained the two countries’ relations and led to the so-called
“Chinese-French rift” [21]. We also find that reporting in
Japan and South Korea is shifting towards Chinese politics.
The shift is statistically significant for South Korea. China
is the largest trading partner for both countries and yet both
seem to be talking more about Chinese politics. One plausible
explanation for their behavior is geopolitics. Both are China’s
close neighbors and both are allies of the United States. They
might perceive China’s rise as a security threat. This can be
better analyzed in terms of sentiment of the coverage, which
is the topic of the next subsection.
C. Sentiment of the Coverage
For each newspaper and each year, we collect all its articles
on China, concatenate them, and calculate its overall China
Friendliness Index. The result is shown in Figure 4. To test
the significance of the trend, we regress the Index against time
for each country. Regression results are also reported.
Australia coef.=0.058 t=3.03 p=0.007
France coef.=0.013 t=0.68 p=0.507
Germany coef.=-0.034 t=-5.21 p=0.000
Japan coef.=-0.044 t=-2.61 p=0.016
Russia coef.=-0.259 t=-4.02 p=0.001
S. Korea coef.=-0.017 t=-0.47 p=0.648
UK coef.=-0.014 t=-1.22 p=0.233
US coef.=-0.037 t=-3.89 p=0.000
Fig. 4: How is the world feeling about China: positive or
negative?
According to the data, Australia is the only country under
examination that has become unequivocally more friendly
towards China. Indeed, Australia is the only country that
we identify as realigning with China: it is reporting more
on China, the reports are increasingly focused on China’s
economy, and it is becoming more positive towards China.10
The China Friendliness Index in France has risen too, but the
increase is not statistically significant. The Friendliness Index
has dropped in all other countries. The drop is statistically
significant in Germany, Japan, Russia and the US.
For external validation, we compare our Index with public
opinion poll data. As noted, time series poll data on attitudes
towards China is rare; only Gallup (US) has opinion data that
goes back to 1979, and Genron-NPO (Japan) has opinion data
that covers the period between 2005 and 2014. In order to
use a consistent source, we will use survey data from Pew
Research Center, a widely recognized data source and authority
for international relations studies [23], [24]. Pew’s surveys,
from 2007 to 2013, cover seven of the eight countries under
10Huntington has argued that Australia is a “torn” country where its leaders
try to delink their country from the West and make it a part of Asia [22].
examination, excepting only Australia, which was surveyed
only twice in the period.11 For the case of Australia, we decide
to use data from Lowy Institute for International Policy, which
covers all the years between 2006 and 2014.12 The result is
shown in Figure 5.13 The correlation coefficient (corr) for each
country is also reported.
Australia corr=0.69 Russia corr=0.48
France corr=0.62 S. Korea corr=0.84
Japan corr=0.83 UK corr=0.37
Germany corr=0.69 US corr=-0.06
Fig. 5: Compare the China Friendliness Index with opinion
poll data.
Comparing the Index with survey data from Pew Research
Center, the highest correlations are achieved in South Korea
(0.84) and Japan (0.83) and the lowest two are in the UK (0.37)
and the US (-0.06). Given that opinion polls are carried out
only in certain periods of a year, while the Index is constructed
on an annual basis, the correlation analysis is satisfactory. It
should be noticed, however, that using a different set of survey
data may produce different results. For example, the correlation
coefficient between the China Friendliness Index and Gallup
opinion poll data on the US is 0.6834.14
While we do expect our Index to be positively correlated
with opinion poll data, we suggest that lower correlation
coefficients as in the case of Russia and the US not be
interpreted as inferior results. A lower correlation could reflect
a stronger role of the news media in agenda-setting [16].
Ideally we should compare our results with the aggregated
poll data from different pollsters to eliminate potential bias,
but data on attitudes towards China is generally lacking.
11http://www.pewresearch.org.
12http://www.lowyinstitute.org.
13In completing Figure 5, we first apply an affine transformation to the
survey data. The transformation does not affect the correlation coefficient, as
corr(x, ay+b) = corr(x,y).
14http://www.gallup.com/poll/1627/China.aspx.
V. CHINA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS: DETAILED
ANALYSIS
In this section, we present findings on four topics that are
of particular importance to China. 1). Conservative newspapers
are more China-friendly than the liberal ones. 2). The special
relationship between the US and the UK extends to their
foreign relations with China. 3). “Hot economics and cold
politics” is a general feature of China’s bilateral relations.
4). Hong Kong protests do not have a significant impact on
China’s foreign relations.
A. Conservative vs Liberal
Like political parties, newspapers can be more conservative
(right) or liberal (left). Is there any difference in their reports
on China? To answer this question, we contrast the sentiments
towards China in left and right newspapers in the US and the
UK. For the US, we compare The Wall Street Journal (right)
and The New York Times (left); for the UK, we study The
Telegraph (right) and The Guardian (left). The result is shown
in Figure 6.
Fig. 6: Conservative newspapers are more China-friendly than
liberal newspapers.
The results show that the China Friendliness Index is higher
for the conservative newspaper in both countries. In the US,
sentiments reported by the conservative newspaper and the
liberal newspaper have diverged substantially over the past two
decades. This is exactly the period when China’s economy took
off. Assuming that the difference between the two newspapers’
index values is normally distributed between 1991 and 2014,
we perform a paired t test for statistical significance. We find
that the difference between the two newspapers is statistically
significant.
Comparison in the UK is limited by data availability but
we can see that after 2002, the conservative Telegraph has
invariably been more friendly towards China than the more
liberal Guardian. We perform the same paired t-test on the
Index scores for The Telegraph and The Guardian from 2003 to
2014. We find that the difference between the two newspapers
is significant. One possible explanation for this disparity is
that conservative newspapers stand for big businesses and free
TABLE III: Paired t test (Wall Street Journal and New York
Times)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
right 24 9.945 0.241 1.180 9.447 10.444
left 24 8.047 0.177 0.868 7.681 8.414
diff 24 1.898 0.221 1.084 1.440 2.356
mean(diff) = mean(right - left) t = 8.799
Ho: mean(diff) = 0 degrees of freedom = 23
Ha: mean(diff) <0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) >0
Pr(T <t) = 1.000 Pr( |T | >t) = 0.000 Pr(T >t) = 0.000
trade, and thus tend to view China more in terms of economic
opportunities.
TABLE IV: Paired t test (The Telegraph and The Guardian)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
right 12 9.132 0.228 0.789 8.632 9.633
left 12 7.112 0.332 1.150 6.381 7.843
diff 12 2.020 0.289 1.001 1.384 2.657
mean(diff) = mean(right - left) t = 6.988
Ho: mean(diff) = 0 degrees of freedom = 11
Ha: mean(diff) <0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) >0
Pr(T <t) = 1.000 Pr( |T | >t) = 0.000 Pr(T >t) = 0.000
B. Correlation between the UK and US Reporting
“Special relationship” is a term used to characterize the
close economic, cultural and political ties between the United
Kingdom and the United States [25]. A closer analysis reveals
that this special relationship also extends to their attitudes
towards China. Trends in the two countries’ China Friendliness
Index closely match each other, as evidenced in Figure 7.
Fig. 7: UK and US, united in their attitudes towards China.
Moreover, by calculating correlation coefficients of the
indexes, we are able to show that the correlation between the
UK and the US is among the highest of all the 28 country
pairs. We notice that the strongest correlation occurs between
Germany and Russia, which we did not anticipate. But this
very discovery draws our attention to the existence of a rich
literature on the “special relationship" between Germany and
Russia [26]. We also point out that the observation period for
the UK-US relationship (30 years) is substantially longer than
that for the Germany-Russia relationship (14 years).
TABLE V: Correlations in Friendly Reporting on China
US UK FR DE AU KR JP RU
US 1
UK 0.68 1
FR 0.35 0.27 1
DE 0.33 0.67 -0.06 1
AU 0.15 0.31 0.31 -0.09 1
KR 0.41 0.72 -0.16 0.52 0.22 1
JP 0.33 0.26 -0.10 0.50 -0.07 0.28 1
RU 0.40 0.67 0.13 0.77 -0.15 0.75 0.38 1
C. Cold Politics and Hot Economics
“Cold politics and hot economics,” often regarded as a
defining feature of China-Japan relations, refers to the fact
that China and Japan trade heavily with each other and yet
both have a very unfavorable view of each other when it
comes to foreign relations [27]. Our study explores whether
or not “cold politics and hot economics” applies, in different
degrees, to China’s other bilateral relations. As described in
Section 3, we first classify the news stories as either economic
or political, then concatenate the articles in each group, and
lastly calculate the China Friendliness Index for each group.
The result is shown in Figure 8. We also conduct paired t-tests,
reported beneath Figure 8, to compare the index for economic
articles and the index for political articles. We find that the
difference is statistically significant for all the eight countries.
The findings are quite surprising. Apparently “cold poli-
Australia mean=5.11 t=12.37 p=0.000
France mean=3.28 t=19.99 p=0.000
Germany mean=0.61 t=4.09 p=0.001
Japan mean=3.94 t=10.09 p=0.000
Russia mean=3.63 t=8.38 p=0.000
S. Korea mean=4.37 t=10.41 p=0.000
UK mean=3.58 t=12.53 p=0.000
US mean=3.76 t=15.29 p=0.000
Fig. 8: Cold politics and hot economics.
tics and hot economics” applies to all of China’s bilateral
relations under examination. Further research is needed to
decide whether “cold politics and hot economics” is a general
description of international relations, of which China-Japan
relations are just an extreme case, or it applies only to China
and China’s bilateral relations.
D. Impact of 2014 Hong Kong protests
Large-scale protests against Beijing’s proposed electoral re-
forms erupted in Hong Kong in September 2014. The protests
had received continuous and intensive coverage by worldwide
media, and were described by The Wall Street Journal as Hong
Kong’s “most serious confrontation with Beijing in more than
a decade” [28]. It is therefore important to be able to measure
their real impact. On the economic front, the World Bank has
answered the question. The event “does not appear to have an
impact on the overall business confidence” [29]. This study
examines the political front and shows that the event does not
appear to have an impact on China’s bilateral relations.
Fig. 9: Put the Hong Kong protests in perspective.
As Figure 9 shows, the Friendliness Index has actually
improved for all the eight countries in 2014.15 To better
evaluate the event’s impact, we carry out a cross-sectional
analysis on a monthly basis. Here we study the UK, which
ruled Hong Kong until 1997, and the US. The findings are
reported in Figure 10.
It can be seen that the protests, which started in late
September, did not have a significant impact on the Index for
that month in either country. In October, a dip in the Index was
observed in the US and news reporting became more political,
but the Index quickly recovered in November. No parallel dip
was observed in the UK and there was no increase in political
reporting. The Economist later described Britain’s response as
“limp” [30].
15Simultaneous warming in the eight countries has historical precedents.
For example, the eight countries became unanimously more friendly towards
China in 2002.
Fig. 10: Effects of Hong Kong protests on the Friendliness
Index.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
China’s rise is rapidly changing the international structure,
bringing both opportunities and challenges to other countries.
International perceptions matter. In this article, we apply text
classification and sentiment analysis techniques to capture
these perceptions.
We find that there has been increasing news coverage of
China in all the countries under study. We also find that the
emphasis of the foreign reports is generally shifting towards
China’s economy. Japan and South Korea are exceptions:
they are reporting more on Chinese politics instead. In terms
of global sentiment, the picture is quite gloomy. With the
exception of Australia and, to some extent, France, all the
other countries under examination are becoming less positive
towards China.
So far as we know, our paper is the first of its kind that
applies data mining to the study of international relations
based on large-scale online news media data. The results
we achieve are very encouraging and they contribute to a
better understanding of the evolving nature of China’s bilateral
relations.
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